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EXTENDING DYNAMIC DOXASTIC LOGIC:
ACCOMMODATING ITERATED BELIEFS AND RAMSEY
CONDITIONALS WITHIN DDL*
Sten Lindström and Wlodek Rabinowicz
In this paper we distinguish between various kinds of doxastic theories.  One distinction is
between informal and formal doxastic theories.  AGM-type theories of belief change are of
the former kind, while Hintikka’s logic of knowledge and belief is of the latter.  Then we dis-
tinguish between static theories that study the unchanging beliefs of a certain agent and
dynamic theories that investigate not only the constraints that can reasonably be imposed on
the doxastic states of a rational agent but also rationality constraints on the changes of doxas-
tic state that may occur in such agents.  An additional distinction is that between non-intro-
spective theories and introspective ones.  Non-introspective theories investigate agents that
have opinions about the external world but no higher-order opinions about their own doxastic
states.  Standard AGM-type theories as well as the currently existing versions of Segerberg’s
dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) are non-introspective.  Hintikka-style doxastic logic is of
course introspective but it is a static theory.  Thus, the challenge remains to devise doxastic
theories that are both dynamic and introspective.  We outline the semantics for a truly intro-
spective dynamic doxastic logic, i.e., a dynamic doxastic logic that allows us to describe
agents who have both the ability to form higher-order beliefs and to reflect upon and change
their minds about their own (higher-order) beliefs.  This extension of DDL demands that we
give up the Preservation condition on revision.  We make some suggestions as to how such a
non-preservative revision operation can be constructed.  We also consider extending DDL
with conditionals satisfying the Ramsey test and show that Gärdenfors’ well-known impos-
sibility result applies to such a framework.  Also in this case, Preservation has to be given up.
1.  Static doxastic logic: Hintikka’s logic of knowledge and belief
The modern development in doxastic logic (the logic of belief) and epistemic
logic (the logic of knowledge) started with Jaakko Hintikka’s seminal book
Knowledge and Belief (1962).  Hintikka’s basic idea was to apply the possible
worlds semantics for modal logic to so-called propositional attitude construc-
tions like “believes that” and “knows that”.  According to Hintikka to ascribe
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2knowledge to a person x is to invoke the idea of a set of “epistemically” possible
worlds (with respect to the person x).  These worlds, the person’s epistemic
alternatives are precisely the worlds that are compatible with everything that the
person knows (in the actual world).  Although they all agree with respect to
what the person knows, they still differ in ways that make them incompatible
with each other.  The analogy with necessity leads to the following principle for
knowledge:
x knows that α (in the actual world) if and only if, in every possible world
compatible with what x knows it is the case that α.
Similarly, the concept of belief appeals to the idea of a set of “doxastically”
possible worlds (the agent’s doxastic alternatives).  The corresponding principle
is:
x believes that α if and only if, in every possible world compatible with
what x believes it is the case that α.
It is natural to assume:
(i) Knowledge implies truth.  Hence, the actual world is itself one of
the possible worlds that is compatible with everything the agent
knows in the actual world.  That is, the actual world is one of the
epistemic alternatives for the agent in the actual world.
(ii) Knowledge implies belief.  Hence, if a possible world is compatible
with everything the agent believes, then it is compatible with every-
thing he knows.  That is, the set of doxastic alternatives is a subset
of the set of epistemic alternatives.
In the formal development of doxastic/epistemic logic, Hintikka extends a
language of sentential or predicate logic with special operators of knowledge
and belief:1
Kα  for “the agent knows that α”.
Bα for “the agent believes that α”.
Writing
wRKv for “the world v is compatible with everything that the agent knows
in the world w”.
1
 The philosophically most interesting aspects of Hintikka’s epistemic/doxastic logic are con-
cerned with the interplay between propositional attitudes and quantifiers: for instance,
Hintikka’s analyses of the de dicto-de re distinction, knowing who constructions, and inter-
rogatives.  This dimension falls outside the scope of the present paper, since we are con-
cerned with sentential doxastic logic only.
3wRBv for “the world v is compatible with everything that the agent
believes in the world w”.
one gets the following truth-clauses for these operators:
Kα is true in w iff for every v, if wRKv, then α is true in v.
Bα is true in w iff for every v, if wRBv, then α is true in v.
For each world w, the sets K(w) = {v: wRKv} and B(w) = {v: wRBv} are the
sets of the agent’s epistemic and doxastic alternatives in the world w, respec-
tively.  We assume that:
(i) for every w, w ∈ K(w)
(ii) for every w, B(w) ⊆ K(w).
(i) says that the world w is itself compatible with everything that the agent
knows to be true in that world.  This is so, since knowledge implies truth.  (ii)
says that if a world is compatible with everything the agent believes, then it is
also compatible with everything he knows.  The motivation for this principle is
that the set of all propositions that constitute the agent’s knowledge constitutes a
(possibly proper) subset of the set of the agent’s beliefs.  Hence, to be compati-
ble with all that is believed is at least as stringent a requirement on a world as is
the one of being compatible with all that is known.
Writing ‚ α for α being logically valid, i.e., true in every world in every
model, one gets the following minimal set of principles for Hintikka-style epis-
temic/doxastic logic:
(1) ‚  K(α → β) → (Kα → Kβ)
(2) ‚  B(α → β) → (Bα → Bβ)
(3) ‚  Kα → α (Veridicality of Knowledge)
(4) ‚  Kα → Bα
(5) If ‚ α, then ‚ Kα
(6) If ‚ α, then ‚ Bα
From now on, our main subject will be the concept of belief and we shall
return to knowledge only occasionally.  The principles (2) and (6), although by
no means uncontroversial, will constitute our basic logic for the belief operator
B.  By imposing additional requirements on the relation RB, one can ensure that
some or all of the following principles are also satisfied:
(7) ¬B⊥  (Consistency)
(8) BBα → Bα  (Veridicality of Positive Introspection)
(9) ¬B⊥ → (B¬Bα → ¬Bα) (Veridicality of Negative Introspection)
(10) Bα → BBα  (Positive Introspection)
4(11) ¬Bα → B¬Bα  (Negative Introspection)
(7), for example, says that a logical contradiction (symbolised by ⊥) is never
believed.  (11) says that if the agent does not believe that α, then he believes that
he does not believe that α.  These and other principles for iterated beliefs will be
discussed in due course.




The intended readings of these are given by:
kα: “It is possible, for all that the agent knows, that α”.
bα: “It is compatible with everything the agent believes that α”.
2.  AGM-type theories of belief change
In a doxastic logic of Hintikka-type it is possible to represent and reason about
the static aspects of an agent’s beliefs about the world: it studies the various
constraints that one might think that a rational agent or a set of rational agents
should satisfy.  Such a logic cannot, however, be used to reason about doxastic
change, i.e., the various kinds of doxastic actions that an agent may perform.
The agent may, for instance, revise his beliefs by adding a new piece of infor-
mation, while at the same time making adjustments to his stock of beliefs in
order to preserve consistency.  Or he may contract his beliefs by giving up a
proposition that he formerly believed.  Such operations of doxastic change are
studied in the theories of rational belief change that started with the work of
Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson in the 80’s: the so-called AGM-
approach.  According to AGM, there are three basic types of doxastic actions:
Expansion:  The agent adds a new belief α to his stock of old beliefs with-
out giving up any old beliefs.  If G is the set of old beliefs, then G+α
denotes the set of beliefs that results from expanding G with α.  To expand
is dangerous, since G+α might very well be logically inconsistent; and
inconsistency is something that we should try to avoid in our beliefs.
Contraction:  The agent gives up a proposition α that was formerly
believed. This requires that he also gives up other propositions that logi-
cally imply the proposition α.  We use G–α to denote the result of contract-
ing α from the old set G of beliefs.
5Revision:  The revision G∗α of the set G with the new information α is the
result of adding α to G in such a way that consistency is preserved when-
ever possible.  The idea is that G∗α should be a set of beliefs that preserves
as much as possible of the information that is contained in G and still con-
tains α.  G∗α should be a minimal change of G that incorporates α.
The following is an important guiding principle when revising and contracting
belief sets:
The Principle of Conservatism:  Try not to give up or add information to
your original belief set unnecessarily.
Within the AGM approach, the agent’s belief state is represented by his belief
set, i.e., the set G of all sentences α such that the agent believes that α.  An
underlying deductive logic is assumed and the operation of revision is assumed
to satisfy the following axioms:
Gärdenfors’ axioms for revision:
(R0) Every belief set G is closed under logical consequence (of the
underlying deductive logic).
(R1)  α ∈ G∗α, that is, the new information α is contained in G∗α
(R2)  If α is consistent with G, then G∗α = G+α , that is, G∗α is the
smallest logically closed set Γ such that G ∪ {α} ⊆ Γ.
(R3)  G∗α is consistent if and only if α is consistent.
(R4)  If α and β logically equivalent, then
G∗α = G∗β.
(R5) If β is consistent with G∗α, then
G∗(α ∧ β) = (G ∗ α)+β.
AGM also contains axioms for contraction (omitted here) as well as the follow-
ing bridging principles:
G∗α = (G–¬α)+α (The Levi identity)
G–α = (G∗α) ∩ (G∗¬α) (The Harper identity)
The Levi identity says that the result of revising the belief set G by the sen-
tence α equals the result of first making room for α by (if necessary) contracting
G with ¬α and then expanding the result with α.  The Harper identity says that
the result of contracting α from G is the common part of G revised with α and G
revised with ¬α.
6Adam Grove's (1988) possible worlds modeling for AGM
In his (1988) paper, Grove presents two closely related possible worlds model-
ings of AGM-type belief revision, one in terms of a family of “spheres” around
the agent’s belief set (or theory) G and the other in terms of an epistemic
entrenchment ordering of propositions.2  Intuitively, a proposition α is at least as
entrenched in the agent’s belief set as another proposition β if and only if the
following holds: provided the agent would have to revise his beliefs so as to
falsify the conjunction α ∧ β, he should do it in such a way as to allow for the
falsity of β.
The “sphere”-terminology is natural when one looks upon belief sets
(theories) and propositions as being represented by sets of possible worlds.
Grove’s spheres may be thought of as possible “fallback” theories relative to the
agent’s original theory: theories that he may reach by deleting propositions that
are not “sufficiently” entrenched (according to standards of sufficient entrench-
ment of varying stringency).  To put it differently, fallbacks are theories that are
closed upwards under entrenchment: if T is a fallback, α belongs to T, and β is
at least as entrenched as α, then β also belongs to T.  The entrenchment ordering
can be recovered from the family of fallbacks by the definition: α is at least as
entrenched as β if and only if α belongs to every fallback to which β belongs.
Representing theories and propositions as sets of possible worlds, the follow-
ing picture illustrates Grove’s family of spheres around a given theory G and his
definition of revision.  Notice that the spheres around a theory are “nested”, i.e.,
simply ordered. For any two spheres, one is included in the other.  Grove’s fam-
ily of spheres closely resembles Lewis’ sphere semantics for counterfactuals, the
main difference being that Lewis’ spheres are “centered” around a single world
instead of a theory (a set of worlds).
2
 Actually, Grove works with an ordering of epistemic plausibility.  But as Gärdenfors (1988,
sect. 4.8) points out, the notions of plausibility and entrenchment are interdefinable.  Thus, a
proposition α is at least as plausible as a proposition β  given the agent’s beliefs if and only
if non-β is at least as entrenched as non-α in the agent’s belief set.  The notion of epistemic
entrenchment is primarily defined for the propositions that belong to the agent’s belief set:
one adopts the convention that propositions that are not believed by the agent are minimally
entrenched.  On the other hand, the notion of plausibility primarily applies to the propositions
that are incompatible with the agent’s beliefs (the propositions that are compatible with what
he believes are all taken to be equally and maximally plausible).  Thus, this is a notion of
conditional plausibility.  α is at least as plausible as β in this sense iff the following holds: on
the condition that I would have to revise my beliefs with α ∨ β, I should change them in such
a way as to allow for α.
7The shaded area H represents the revision of G with a proposition α.  The revi-
sion of G with α is defined as the strongest α-permitting fallback theory of G
expanded with α.  In the possible worlds representation, this is the intersection
of α with the smallest sphere around G that is compatible with α.  (Any revision
has to contain the proposition we revise with.  Therefore, if α is logically incon-
sistent, the revision with α is taken to be the inconsistent theory.)
Lindström & Rabinowicz: non-deterministic revision
In a series of papers, Lindström and Rabinowicz proposed a generalization of
the AGM approach according to which belief revision was treated as a relation
GRαH between theories (belief sets) rather than as a function on theories.3  The
idea was to allow for there being several equally reasonable revisions of a theory
with a given proposition.  Thus, GRαH means that H is one of those reasonable
revision of the theory G with the new information α.  AGM, of course, assumes
that belief revision is functional (or deterministic), that is,
If GRαH and GRαH’, then H = H’.
Given this assumption, one can define:
G∗α = the theory H such that GRαH.
The relational notion of belief revision results from weakening epistemic
entrenchment by not assuming it to be connected. In other words, we allow that
some propositions may be incomparable with respect to epistemic entrenchment.
As a result, the family of fallbacks around a given theory will no longer have to
be nested.  It will no longer be a family of spheres but rather a family of
3
 Cf. Lindström and Rabinowicz (1989), (1990), (1992) and Rabinowicz and Lindström
(1984).
8“ellipses”.  This change opens up the possibility for several different ways of
revising a theory with a given proposition.
In this figure, the two ellipses represent two different fallback theories for G,
each of which is a strongest α-permitting fallback.  Consequently, there are two
possible revisions of G with α: each one of H and K is the intersection of α with
a strongest α-permitting fallback.
3.  Dynamic doxastic logic
The theories of belief change developed within the AGM-tradition are not dox-
astic logics in the formal sense, but rather informal axiomatic theories of belief
change.  Instead of characterizing the models of belief and belief change in a
formalized object language, the AGM-approach uses a natural language — like
ordinary mathematical English — to characterize the mathematical structures
that are under study.  Recently, however, various authors such as van Benthem
and Maarten de Rijke have suggested representing epistemic change within a
formal logical language: a dynamic modal logic.  Inspired by these suggestions
Krister Segerberg has developed a very general logical framework for reasoning
about doxastic change: dynamic doxastic logic (DDL).4  This framework may be
seen as an extension of standard Hintikka-style doxastic logic with dynamic
operators representing various kinds of transformations of the agent's doxastic
state.  Segerberg writes +α, ∗α, and –α, respectively, for the doxastic actions of
expanding, revising and contracting the agent’s beliefs with (the information
contained in) the sentence α.  Hence, +α denotes the action of simply adding α
4
  Cf. Segerberg (1995), (1996a) and (1996b).
9to the stock of beliefs (without checking for consistency).  ∗α is the action of
adding α, while at the same time modifying the belief state in such a way that
consistency is preserved, whenever possible.  –α, finally, means that the agent
changes his belief state in such a way that any belief that α is given up.  In DDL,
one uses the following notation with the following informal meaning:
[+α]β “If the agent were to expand his beliefs with α, then it would be 
the case that β”.
[∗α]β “If the agent were to revise his beliefs with α, then it would be 
the case that β”.
[–α]β “If the agent were to contract his beliefs with α, then it would be 
the case that β”.
As long as the agent’s belief state is not part of the world, doxastic actions do
not affect the world.  Thus, if β expresses a worldly proposition, i.e., a proposi-
tion that only concerns the (external) world, then we should expect [+α]β ↔ β
to hold, and similarly for the other doxastic actions.  So the interesting case is
the one when β contains epistemic operators.  In particular, we are interested in
statements of the forms: [+α]Bβ, [∗α]Bβ, [–α]Bβ.  For example,
[∗α]Bβ
means: if the agent were to revise his beliefs with α, he would believe β.  In the
AGM approach this kind of statement is expressed as:
β ∈ G∗α,
where G refers to the agent’s current belief set, i.e., the set of all sentences σ
such that the agent believes σ, and G∗α is the belief set that results from revis-
ing G by α.  In AGM, [+α]Bβ and [–α]Bβ correspond to, respectively, β ∈ G+α
and β ∈ G–α.
DDL allows for the possibility of belief change being nondeterministic: there
may be many different ways for the agent of revising his beliefs with α (Cf.
Lindström & Rabinowicz above).  Hence, we must distinguish between:
[∗α]Bβ “If the agent were to revise his beliefs with α, he would believe 
that β”.
<∗α>Bβ “If the agent were to revise his beliefs with α, he might believe 
that β”.
<∗α> is definable in terms of [∗α] in the following way:
<∗α>β = ¬[∗α]¬β.
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In the same way, one can define <+α> and <–α>.  For theories like the original
AGM-theory in which belief change is deterministic, one would have <∗α>β ↔
[∗α]β, and similarly for contraction.  Expansion, is of course always determinis-
tic, i.e., <+α>β ↔ [+α]β.
4.  The various types of doxastic agents
In this section, we are going to distinguish between five types of doxastic agents
and accordingly between five types of doxastic theories.  This categorization is
based on the following distinctions:  First, we distinguish between static and
dynamic agents.  A static agent has no capacity to change his beliefs.  A
dynamic agent can change his belief state, for example, in response to new
information. Another distinction is that between a non-introspective and an
introspective agent.  An agent is non-introspective, if he can only form beliefs
about the external world and has no capacity to form beliefs about his own belief
states.  An introspective agent is an agent who can also form beliefs about his
own belief states.  Finally, we distinguish between introspective dynamic agents
that can only receive informational inputs that concern the external world and
such agents that can also receive inputs about their own belief states.  In terms of
these distinctions, we can define:
Type 1 agents: Non-introspective static agents. (Examples: a fixed data
base that you can query for information.  An industrial robot that cannot
learn from experience.)
Corresponding theories:  Hintikka-type doxastic logic that does not allow
for the nesting of belief-operators.
Type 2 agents: Introspective static agents.
Corresponding theories:  Hintikka-type doxastic and epistemic logics.
Type 3 agents: Non-introspective dynamic agents.  (Examples: Dynamic
data bases.  Neural networks that can learn from experience.)
Corresponding theories:  (Most) theories of Belief Revision within the
AGM-tradition.  Segerberg’s dynamic doxastic logic, where the dynamic
action statements of the form [Oα]Bβ, where O represents some kind of
doxastic action, are restricted in such a way that the sentences α and β are
required to be Boolean (i.e., express worldly propositions).5
5
  A sentence is said to be Boolean if it is built up from propositional letters by means of
classical (“Boolean”) sentential connectives only.
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Type 4 agents: Introspective dynamic agents whose doxastic inputs are
limited to propositions about the (external) world.
Corresponding theories.  Dynamic doxastic logics, where the dynamic
action statements of the form [Oα]Bβ are restricted in such a way that the
sentences α is required to be Boolean (i.e., express worldly propositions).
β is allowed to be any sentence, also one involving doxastic and dynamic
operators.
Type 5 agents: Introspective dynamic agents whose doxastic inputs may
also be propositions about the agent’s own doxastic states.
Corresponding theories:  Dynamic doxastic logics, where the dynamic
action statements of the form [Oα]Bβ are unlimited: both α  and β are
allowed to be any sentences.
Type 1 agents (Non-introspective static agents)
The most primitive kind of agent that we shall consider is a static doxastic agent
that lacks any power of introspection.  Such an agent we say is of type 1.  A type
1 agent has beliefs about the external world but no ability to change his beliefs
or to form higher-order beliefs about his own beliefs.  The total belief state of a
type 1 agent can be represented by a belief set, i.e., the set of all propositions
that are believed by the agent:
The belief set of the agent = {P: the agent believes that P}.
All the propositions of an agent of type 1 are what we might call worldly propo-
sitions: they concern the external world only and are logically independent of
the doxastic state of the agent (the agent might have beliefs about the doxastic
states of other agents in so far as these are considered to be part of the external
world.)  Roughly speaking, a type 1 agent can have a belief of type “Snow is
white” but not one of the kind “I believe that snow is white”.  When the theo-
retician describes such an agent he will make use of statements of the type:
Jones believes that snow is white
but not:
Jones believes that he believes that snow is white.
A doxastic logic for type 1 agents.
We consider a propositional language with Boolean formulas built up from a
non-empty set of propositional letters by means of the usual sentential connec-
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tives ¬, ∧, ∨, →.  The set of formulas is the smallest set satisfying the condi-
tions:
(i) Boolean formulas are formulas.
(ii) If α is a Boolean formula, then Bα is a formula.
(iii) If α, β are formulas, then ¬α, (α ∧ β), (α ∨ β), (α → β) are formu-
las.
Observe that this language does not allow for the iteration of the belief operator
B.  Intuitively, Boolean formulas express worldly propositions and the belief
operator (or belief predicate) should apply to worldly propositions only.
The models are structures of the form M = <W, Bel, V>, where:
(i) W is a non-empty set (of possible worlds).  W represents all the
possible states the world could be in.
(ii) Bel ⊆ W.  Intuitively, Bel is the set of possible worlds that are com-
patible with everything that the agent (actually) believes about the
world.
(iii) V is a valuation function assigning a subset V(p) of W to every
propositional letter p.
We define the notion of truth of a formula α relative a modelM and a world w
(in M) as follows (we suppress the reference to M):
(i) w ‚ p if and only if w ∈ V(p)
(ii) w ‚ ¬α iff not: w ‚ α.  (and so on, for the other sentential connec-
tives)
(iii) w ‚ Bα if and only if Bel ⊆ ≠α≠, where ≠α≠ = {w: w ‚ α}.  That
is, w ‚  Bα if and only if α is true in every possible world that is
compatible with the agent’s beliefs.
A formula is valid if it is true in every world in every model.  The set of valid
formulas can easily be proven to be equal to the smallest set Σ satisfying the fol-
lowing conditions:
(T) All substitution instances of sentential tautologies.
(K) All instances of B(α → β) → (Bα → Bβ) are in Σ.
(MP) If α ∈ Σ and (α → β) ∈ Σ, then β ∈ Σ.
(N) If α ∈ Σ, then Bα ∈ Σ.
Type 2 agents (Introspective static agents).
These are static agents that can have (and in fact have) beliefs about their own
beliefs.  We shall only consider type 2 agents of level ω (omega), that is, agent’s
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that have not only beliefs about the world, but also beliefs about his own beliefs
about the world, beliefs about such beliefs, etc.  For any n=1, 2,... such an agent
has beliefs of order n.  The belief state of a type 2 agent can also be described by
a belief set:
{P: the agent believes P}.
But observe that the belief set of a type 2 agent will contain propositions (or
statements) that themselves concern the agents beliefs.  For instance, the belief
set may contain the proposition:
Believes(Snow is white) and ¬Believes (Grass is green).
This proposition is an element of the belief set just in case:
The agent believes that: he believes that snow is white and does not
believe that Grass is green.
Moore’s paradox:  Consider, an agent of type 2 whose belief set contains
(1) It is raining but I don’t believe it.
It is true about such an agent that:
(2) The agent believes that: Snow is white and the agent does not
believe that snow is white.
We may ask whether such an agent is irrational.  Is he inconsistent?
Remark:  Compare the following two situations:
(1) Jones believes: It is raining and I don’t believe it.
(2) Smith believes: It is raining and Smith does not believe it
It seems that Jones is worse off than Smith.  From (1) we may conclude:
(3) Jones believes that it is raining.
(4) Jones believes that he (himself) does not believe that it is raining.
It seems odd — if not outright inconsistent — for a self-reflective agent to be in
a doxastic state characterized by (3) and (4).  Consider now Smith, the amnesiac,
who does not know that he is Smith.  Couldn’t he be in the situation (2) without
being irrational or inconsistent?  Finally, suppose that Jones is an amnesiac (who
believes that he is Smith).  Would that change anything in the case (1)?  In our
opinion, the answer is: No.
Hintikka-style doxastic logic may be viewed as a logic for doxastic agents of
type 2.
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Type 3 agents (Non-introspective dynamic agents)
Like a type 1 agent, a type 3 agent has beliefs about the world but no beliefs
about his own beliefs.  However, a type 3 agent also has dispositions to change
his beliefs about the world in response to new information.  The theories devel-
oped within the AGM-tradition can be viewed as theories that concern type 3
agents: they study the doxastic states and the transformations of doxastic states
of an agent that is, so to speak, placed “outside of the world”.  The agent’s
beliefs are about a constant external world that is not affected by the changes in
the agent’s doxastic state.  All propositions believed and all epistemic inputs
concern this “mind independent reality”.  Such an agent has no introspective
capacities: he has no beliefs about his own beliefs or his own doxastic disposi-
tions.
Type 4 and type 5 agents (Introspective dynamic agents)
Gärdenfors' axioms appear to be reasonable as long as the sentences of the for-
mal language are taken to represent worldly propositions.  However, in the pres-
ence of doxastic operators in the object language, these axioms will lead to
paradoxical results.6  Suppose that α is a proposition (say “It is raining in Lund
at this moment”) of which I have no firm belief with respect to its truth:
Hence,
(1)  α ∉ G and ¬α ∉ G.
Suppose also that I correctly believe that I do not believe α, i.e.,
(2) ¬Bα ∈ G.
Then, by (R2), the revision of G with α is just the result of expanding G with α,
so:
(3) ¬Bα ∈ G∗α.
But, by (R1),
(4) α ∈ G∗α.
But, then by (R0), i.e., logical closure,
(5) α ∧ ¬Bα ∈ G∗α,
that is in the belief state represented by G∗α it is true that:
 The agent believes that: α and that he does not believe α.
6
 That this is so was pointed out by Levi (1988) and Fuhrmann (1989).
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This is highly counterintuitive (Moore’s Paradox).  In case the underlying logic
for B satisfies positive introspection, we get:
(6) Bα ∧ ¬Bα ∈ G∗α,
which is contrary to (R3).
The culprit seems to be (R2).  The part of (R2) that we actually used was the
following principle,
Preservation:
If α is consistent with G, then if β ∈ G, β ∈ G∗α.
It is the application of this principle to doxastic propositions β that seems to
create the paradoxical result.  Hence, the following weakening of Preservation
suggests itself.
Weak Preservation.
If α is consistent with G, β is Boolean and β ∈ G, then β ∈ G∗α.
Our conclusion is that Gärdenfors' axioms have to be modified as soon as one
considers dynamic doxastic theories for introspective agents.  If revision is not
to be paradoxical for such agents, certain beliefs about one’s own beliefs need to
be abandoned when one receives new information.  For instance, when revising
with α one has to give up the belief that one does not believe α.  Otherwise, one
will automatically acquire a false belief in the process.  Hence, full expansion
has to be abandoned for introspective agents.
5.  Dynamic doxastic logic unlimited: DDL for introspective agents
As developed so far, DDL has been a theory for agents without introspection.
Here we wish to remove this limitation.  Suppose we have a language with a
belief operator B and with different kinds of doxastic dynamic operators of the
form [A], where Α stands for a type of doxastic action.  The dynamic operators
that we are especially interested in are revisions, expansions and contractions:
[∗α] for revision, [+α] for expansion, and [–α] for contraction, where α is sen-
tence that we revise with, expand with or contract with, respectively.  Suppose
now that both B and the dynamic operators are allowed to operate on arbitrary
well-formed formulas, without restriction.  In particular, we allow formulas
expressing iterated beliefs (such as BBα and B¬Bα) or beliefs concerning
results of (potential) doxastic action (such as B[∗α]β or B¬[–α]β).  We also
allow revisions, expansions and contractions with any well-formed formulas.
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Thus, for example, expressions such as [∗Bα]β or [–[+α]β]γ will be well-
formed.
The formal language
Let us now describe our object language L.  We define the sets Term and Form
of terms and formulas to be the smallest sets satisfying the following conditions:
(i) for any n < ω, the propositional letter Pn belongs to Form.
(ii) ⊥ ∈ Form.
(iii) If α, β ∈ Form, then (α → β) ∈ Form.
(iv) If α ∈ Form, then Bα ∈ Form.
(v) If α ∈ Form, then +α, –α, ∗α ∈ Term.
(vi) If τ ∈ Term and α ∈ Form, then [τ]α ∈ Form.
The Boolean connectives ¬α, (α ∧  β), etc. are defined from ⊥ and → in the
usual way.  We define:  <τ>α as ¬[τ]¬α and bα as ¬B¬α.
Semantics for DDL unlimited
Here is a sketch of a semantics appropriate for a dynamic doxastic logic (DDL)
for fully introspective agents.
In general terms, a semantic model for such a logic should contain the follow-
ing components:
(1) A set U = {x, y, z, ...} of total states.  A total state x involves both a
doxastic state of the agent d(x) and a possible world w(x).  By a
possible world, we here mean a state of the world that is external to
the agent.
(2) Hence, we have functions w and d that to each state x in U assign
the world and the doxastic state, respectively, that obtain in x.  We
let W = {w(x): x ∈ U} and D = {d(x): x ∈ U} be the sets of all
possible worlds and all doxastic states, respectively.
(3) A valuation function V that assigns subsets of U to atomic formulas.
For each atomic formula p, V(p) is the proposition expressed in the
model.
For each x, d(x) specifies the agent’s doxastic state in x (the totality of the agen-
t’s beliefs together with his policies-for-belief change), while w(x) specifies the
”external world” of x.  It is therefore reasonable to assume that d(x) and w(x)
together fully characterize the total state x.  Thus, we may assume that:
(i) For all x, y in U, if d(x) = d(y) and w(x) = w(y), then x = y.
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This restriction might suggest a simplification: why not identify elements of U
with ordered pairs of doxastic states and worlds? Here, however, we prefer not
to make this identification, for the following reason: In more specialized ver-
sions of the semantics for DDL, doxastic states will be interpreted as set-theo-
retic constructs built up from states in U.  Given such a construction, reduction
of states to doxastic-states-cum-worlds becomes impossible, unless we are pre-
pared to allow sets that are not well-founded.
In addition to the elements that have already been mentioned, a model should
contain special components that correspond to the different doxastic operators:
either accessibility relations between states, or — what amounts to the same —
functions from states to sets of states.  These components should be made
dependent on the d-function.  Thus, if we let b be the function that to each state
x assigns the set of states that are compatible with what is believed in x (i.e., if b
is to be the component of the model that corresponds to B), then we should
impose the following restriction on b:
(ii) If d(x) = d(y), then b(x) = b(y).
For doxastic dynamic operators, the dependence relationships are somewhat
more complex.  Let Rτ be the accessibility relation on states that corresponds to
the operator [τ].  Since we take τ to be a purely doxastic action, that only modi-
fies the doxastic state but does not ”touch” the (external) world, we must assume
that:
(iii) If Rτ(x, y), then w(x) = w(y).
(This means that we do not consider such impurely doxastic operators as the
operator of updating.  For updating, we would need to consider actions that
transform a state into another state in which the world has changed and the dox-
astic state has registered that world-change and thus has itself been changed
accordingly.)
On the other hand, since the potential results of action τ as far as the doxastic
state is concerned are supposed to be determined by the original doxastic state,
we need to assume that the following holds:
(iv) If Rτ(x, y) and d(x) = d(x’), then for some y’, d(y’) = d(y)
 and Rτ(x’, y’).
Note that by assumption (ii), w(y’) = w(x’), and by the present assumption d(y’)
= d(y).  This means, given assumption (i), that there is exactly one y’ that corre-
sponds to y in this way.  If x is Rτ-related to a state y and d(x) = d(x’), then x’ is
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Rτ-related to the state y’ characterized by the doxastic state d(y) and the external
world w(x’).
The above assumptions seem to be sufficient as far as a general semantics for
DDL is concerned.  Thus, we define a model M to be a structure <U, w, d, b,
R+, R–, R∗, V>, where w, d, b, and V are as described above.  R+ is a function
which for every formula α yields an accessibility relation R+α ⊆  U × U, and
similarly for R– and R∗.  The notion of a formula α being true in a model M at a
state x (in symbols, M, x ‚ α) is defined recursively as follows:
(i) M, x ‚ p iff x ∈ V(p).
(ii) It is not the case that M, x ‚ ⊥.
(iii) M, x ‚  (α → β) iff it is either the case that not: M, x ‚ α or it is
the case that M, x ‚ β.
(iv) M, x ‚ Bα iff ∀y(if y ∈ b(x) → M, y ‚ α)
(v) If τ is a term, then
M, x ‚ [τ]α iff for all y such that Rτ(x, y), M, y ‚ α.
In the following we usually suppress the reference to M and write x ‚ α instead
of M, x ‚ α.
Let X be a class of models.  We then define the notions of X-consequence and
X-validity in the expected way.  α is an X-consequence of a set of formulas Γ (in
symbols, Γ ‚X α) if and only if, for any model M in X and any state x in M, if
M, x ‚  β for every β in Γ, then M, x ‚ α.  α is X-valid (in symbols, ‚X α) if
and only if, for every model M in X and every state x in M, M, x ‚ α.
A proposition is represented as a set of states.7  A worldly proposition is any
proposition P such that, if x ∈ P and w(x) = w(y), then y ∈ P.  If we wish, we
can assume that for every atomic formula p, V(p) is a worldly proposition.  This
will validate such formulae as:
p → [A]p,
where p is an atomic formula and [A] is a purely doxastic dynamic operator.  As
we remember, doxastic action does not touch the world; it only modifies the
doxastic component of a given state.
Worldly propositions may be contrasted with doxastic propositions P for
which the following holds: x ∈ P and d(x) = d(y), then y ∈ P.  Clearly, we also
have a third category: ”mixed” propositions that are neither worldly nor doxas-
tic.
7
  Should we have a family of propositions as an additional element of the models or allow all
sets of states as propositions? For the time being, we follow the latter alternative.
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For every formula α, ≠α≠ = {x ∈ U: x ‚ α} is the proposition expressed by
α, i.e., the set of states at which α is true.  The truth-clause for B can be written
as:
x ‚ Bα iff b(x) ⊆ ≠α≠.
In a Segerberg-style semantics for DDL, we let doxastic states be hypertheo-
ries, i.e. families of subsets of U that satisfy appropriate conditions (cf.
Segerberg).  We then identify b(x) — the set of states that are compatible with
what is believed in x — with ∩d(x), the intersection of all the subsets of U that
belong to d(x).
x ‚ Bα iff ∩d(x) ⊆ ≠α≠.
The LRS-version of DDL is based on Lindström and Rabinowicz’ relational
approach to belief change, which has been augmented by Segerberg with a
specific recipe for belief change iteration.  This recipe allows for an explicit def-
inition of the accessibility relations corresponding to the doxastic dynamic oper-
ators.  In his approach, however, there is no room for iterations of the B-operator
nor is it possible to revise or contract beliefs with propositions other than
worldly ones.  These restrictions are removed in the present paper.
In the LRS-variant of DDL, we can define the accessibility operations for the
operators of expansion, contraction and revision ([+α], [–α] and [∗α], with α
being an arbitrary formula) as follows:
R+α(x, y) iff
(i) w(x) = w(y), and (ii) d(y) = d(x) + ≠α≠ = d(x) ∪ {X∩≠α≠: X ∈
d(x)}.
R–α(x, y) iff
(i)  w(x) = w(y), and
(ii) d(y) = d(x)Z = {X ∈ d(x): Z ⊆ X}, for some element Z that is 
  minimal in {X ∈ d(x): X-≠α≠ ≠ ∅}.
R∗α(x, y) iff
(i)  w(x) = w(y), and
(ii) d(y) = (d(x)Z) + ≠α≠  for some element Z that is minimal
  in {X ∈ d(x): X ∩≠α≠ ≠ ∅}.
Note that R∗α, when defined in this way, is the relative product of R–(¬α) and R+α.
Consequently, [∗α] is explicitly definable as [–(¬α)][+α].  However, as we shall
argue, this Levi-style definition of ∗ will have to be given up in view of the
problem that is presented next.
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Doxastic dynamics for introspective agents
Whether we choose to accept this particular LRS-modelling for DDL or prefer
to work with the general model, we encounter the following difficulty:
Let us say that revision ∗ is strongly paradoxical, if for every state x and
every formula α, the following formula is true in x:
(StrongParadox) bα ∧ B¬Bα → [∗α]B⊥.
The opposite of strong paradoxicality just requires that there should be a state x
and a formula α such that bα ∧ B¬Bα ∧ ¬[∗α]B⊥ holds in x.  This seems to be
a very reasonable requirement on any belief revision operation.
Lemma 1.  Suppose that ∗ satisfies Preservation and Success, while B satisfies
Positive Introspection:
(P) bα → (Bβ → [∗α]Bβ) (Preservation)
(S) [∗α]Bα (Success)
(PI) Bα → BBα. (Positive Introspection)
Then, if the operator [∗α] satisfies closure under logical implication:
if ‚ β → γ, then ‚ [∗α]β →[∗α] γ,
and both [∗α] and B satisfy closure under conjunction, ∗ is strongly paradoxi-
cal.8
Proof:  Suppose that bα ∧ B¬Bα holds in x.  Then, by (P),
(1) [∗α]B¬Bα
is true in x.  But by Success it is also true in x that:
(2) [∗α] Bα.
If [∗α] is closed under logical implication, (2) and (PI) imply that:
(3) [∗α] BBα.
If, in addition, [∗α] and B are closed under conjunction, (3) and (1) imply:
(4) [∗α]B(Bα ∧ ¬Bα),
which in turn yields the desired result: [∗α]B⊥. Q. E. D.
8
 This lemma is closely related to Fuhrmann’s (1989) “paradox of serious possibility”.  In
present terms , Fuhrmann proves ¬B¬α ∧  ¬Bα →  [∗α]B⊥, but he relies on Negative
Introspection in addition to the positive one.  Cf. also Levi (1988).
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Note that even in the absence of Positive Introspection, Preservation plus
Success will yield unacceptable results.  Say that ∗ is paradoxical if and only if,
for every x and α, the following formula is true in x:
(Paradox) bα ∧ B¬Bα → [∗α](Bα ∧ B¬Bα).
This means, in particular, that if the agent holds no opinion as regards α and cor-
rectly believes that he does not believe α, then, upon revision with α, he will
believe that α is true and, at the same time, believe that he does not believe α.
But then he has at least one false belief, namely that he does not believe α.  The
requirement that ∗ should not be paradoxical in this sense seems eminently plau-
sible.
Lemma 2.  Suppose that the ∗ satisfies Preservation and Success.  Then if [∗α]
is closed under conjunction, ∗ is paradoxical.





are true in x.  But then, if [∗α] is closed under conjunction,
(3) [∗α](Bα ∧ B¬Bα)
is true in x. Q. E. D.
A natural conclusion is that we should give up Preservation for ∗: If I origi-
nally neither believe nor disbelieve α and am aware of this fact and then learn
that α is true, some of my original beliefs must be given up.  In particular, I have
to give up my original belief that I do not believe α.
Positive and Negative Introspection (Bα → BBα and ¬Bα → B¬Bα, respec-
tively) should also be given up, but for a different reason, having to do with con-
traction rather than with revision.  Let us first consider why Negative Introspec-
tion is inappropriate as a general requirement.  When we originally do not
believe α and then contract with ¬Bα (i.e., stop believing that we do not believe
α), then ¬Bα should still be true in the contracted state (contracting with ¬Bα
should not make us believe α) but it won’t be believed any longer: B¬Bα will
be false.  Thus, in this intermediary state, Negative Introspection will be vio-
lated.
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That Positive introspection will also sometimes be violated is less obvious,
but think of an agent who originally believes α and believes that he does believe
α.  Suppose he is invited to contract his beliefs with Bα (i.e., stop believing that
he believes α).  In the contracted state, it is no longer true that BBα, but we
would like to allow that it is still true that Bα.  This is, however, impossible
unless positive introspection is violated after the contraction.  If we insisted on
positive introspection being valid, we would have to stop believing α just
because we stop believing that we believe α.  This seems wrong.
While Positive and Negative Introspection should probably be given up, it
seems that we instead might still insist on their converses: we might insist that
an (ideal) agent’s beliefs concerning his own beliefs are never mistaken:
BBα → Bα (Veridicality of Positive Introspection)
¬B⊥ → (B¬Bα → ¬Bα). (Veridicality of Negative Intro-
 spection)
(The latter requirement is a slightly qualified converse of Negative Introspec-
tion: the qualification in the antecedent is added in order to allow states in which
the agent holds inconsistent beliefs.)  In our general semantic framework, these
requirements are validated by the following conditions:
If y ∈ b(x), there is some z ∈ b(x) such that y ∈ b(z).
If b(x) ≠ ∅, there is some y ∈ b(x) such that b(y) ⊆ b(x).
Note that both conditions would follow from the following restriction on the
model:
If b(x) ≠ ∅, there is some y ∈ b(x) such that b(y) = b(x).
According to this condition, the agent is never mistaken about his beliefs.
For future reference, we may also mention an even stronger condition accord-
ing to which an agent is never mistaken about his doxastic state.  Thus, he is not
only never mistaken about his beliefs but also about his policies for belief
change.  He might not be fully informed about his doxastic state (in particular,
he might violate positive and negative introspection) but the beliefs he holds
about it are never false:
FULL VERIDICALITY OF INTROSPECTION:
If b(x) ≠ ∅, there is some y ∈ b(x) such that d(y) = d(x).
Let us now return to our problem with revision.  If revision is not to be para-
doxical, it should not be fully preservative: in particular, certain beliefs about
one’s own beliefs need to be given up when one receives new information.  How
to achieve this result? Here is a suggestion.  Levi-style revision with α consists
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in two steps: we first contract with ¬α and then expand with α.  In some cases,
the first step is vacuous, ¬α is not believed to begin with.  Then revision
reduces to expansion.  These are precisely the cases for which Preservation is
meant to hold: revision has been supposed to be preservative simply because
expansion is cumulative: all the old beliefs are kept when we expand with a new
belief.  Our suggestion is to replace the expansion step in the process of revision
with what might be called cautious expansion: before we expand with α, we
should first make sure that we give up the belief that we do not believe α.
Clearly, this belief should not survive our coming to believe that α.  Thus,
unlike standard expansion, cautious expansion is not fully cumulative: certain
beliefs have to be given up when new beliefs are added.  This suggests the fol-
lowing definition of the cautious expansion operator [⊕α]:
[⊕α]β =df [–(¬Bα)][+α]β.
Thus, cautious expansion with α is itself a two-step process: we first contract
with ¬Bα and only then expand with α.
We can then define revision with α in a new way — as contraction with ¬α
followed by a cautious expansion with α:
[∗α]β =df [–(¬α)][⊕α]β.
How does this relate to the LRS-semantics? The definitions of the accessibility
relations that correspond to contraction and (standard) expansion may be kept
unchanged.  But the accessibility relation that corresponds to revision will have
to be modified.  R∗α will now be interpreted as the relative product of R–(¬α) and
R⊕α, where R⊕α will itself be the relative product of R–(¬Bα) and R+α.
Our definition of cautious expansion would not be satisfactory if introspection
weren’t assumed to be veridical.  To see that, suppose that in the original state in
which he lacks belief that α, the agent is fully reflective, so that ¬Bα, B¬Bα,
BB¬Bα, etc., are all true.  If he then contracts with ¬Bα, as the first step in
cautious expansion with α, then — given the veridicality of introspection — he
will lose not just his belief in ¬Bα but also all his higher order beliefs: not just
B¬Bα, but also BB¬Bα, etc., will all be false.  Otherwise, if he kept one of
these higher beliefs, some of his introspective beliefs would not be veridical.
Proof: Suppose that n (n > 1) is the lowest number such that Bn¬Bα is still true
after contraction.  Then the agent has a false introspective belief that Bn-1¬Bα.
And he would hold on to that false belief after the second step of the cautious
expansion.  This would clearly be an unwanted result.
In fact, it seems reasonable to accept Full Veridicality of Introspection.  Oth-
erwise, when contracting with ¬Bα, we might not get rid of some of the original
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beliefs concerning outcomes of potential belief change — beliefs that are
dependent on our belief in ¬Bα and that would become false when belief in
¬Bα is removed.  As long as we demand Full Veridicality of Introspection, this
possibility need not worry us.
6.  The Ramsey test, Gärdenfors’ impossibility theorem and DDL
In this final section we are going to represent Gärdenfors’ impossibility theorem
for the Ramsey test within the framework of non-introspective DDL (i.e., the
original DDL as developed by Segerberg).  For this purpose, we introduce two
formal languages which we refer to as L> and DL>, respectively.  L> is a lan-
guage of sentential conditional logic with formulas built up from propositional
letters and ⊥ by means of the material conditional → and a non-Boolean condi-
tional connective >.  Formulas of the form (α > β) are read as “If α, then β”.
The language DL> is a version of DDL defined by means of the following
grammatical rules:
(i) formulas of L> are formulas of DL>;
(ii) if α is a formula of L>, then Bα and Mα are formulas of DL>;
(iii) If α is a formula of L>, then +α, –α, ∗α are terms of DL>;
(iv) If τ is a term of L and α is a formula of L, then [τ]α is a formula of
DL>;
(v) If α, β are formulas of DL>, then (α → β) is a formula of DL>.
A model M for DL> is a structure <U, w, d, b, R+, R–, R∗, ⇒, V>, where U, w,
d, b, R+, R–, R∗ and V are defined as before, and ⇒: Pow(U) × Pow(U) →
Pow(U).  The semantic clauses for atomic formulas, the Boolean connectives,
the doxastic operator B, and the dynamic operators are the same as before.
However, there are two new semantic clauses corresponding to the symbols >
and M:
M, x ‚ (α > β) iff x ∈ (≠α≠ ⇒ ≠β≠).
M, x ‚ Mα iff for all y ∈ U, M, y ‚ α.
By the Ramsey test we understand the condition:
(RT) ¬B⊥ → (B(α > β) ↔ [∗α]Bβ).
The proviso that ⊥ is not believed is meant to restrict the test to states in which
the agents beliefs are consistent.  The Ramsey test says that a (consistent) agent
believes a conditional α > β just in case he would believe its consequent β, if he
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were to revise his beliefs with the information that the antecedent α is true.  We
may say that > is a Ramsey conditional if it satisfies the Ramsey test.
We say that a model M is nontrivial, if it satisfies the following condition:
There is a state x ∈ U and formulas α, β, γ of L> such that:
≠α  ∧ β≠ = ∅, ≠α  ∧ γ≠ = ∅, ≠β ∧ γ≠ = ∅ and
x ‚ ¬B¬α, x ‚ ¬B¬β, x ‚ ¬B¬γ.
Nontriviality says that there is a state x and three disjoint propositions α, β and γ
such that the agent’s beliefs in the state x are consistent with each one of α, β,
and γ.
By adapting Gärdenfors’ impossibility result (1988, Chapter 7) to the present
framework we get:
Theorem.  There is no nontrivial model for DL> that validates every instance of
the following conditions:
(RT) ¬B⊥ → (B(α > β) ↔ [∗α]Bβ) (the Ramsey test)
(P) ¬B¬α → (Bβ → [∗α]Bβ) (Preservation)
(S) [∗α]Bα (Success)
(E1) [+α]Bβ ↔ B(α → β)
(E2) [+α]¬Bβ ↔ ¬B(α → β)
(C) [∗α]B⊥ → M¬α. (Consistency)
Proof:9  We first notice that the condition:
(1) ¬B¬α → ([+α]Bβ → [∗α]Bβ)
follows from (P), (S) and (E1).  From this we get that for any α, β, γ,
(2) [+γ]¬B¬α → ([+γ][+α]Bβ → [+γ][∗α]Bβ).
Suppose now that there is a nontrivial model M validating the conditions of
the theorem.  By nontriviality, there are formulas α, β, γ of L> and a state x such
that α, β and γ are disjoint and:
 x ‚ ¬B¬α, x ‚ ¬B¬β, x ‚ ¬B¬γ.
Then, it must also the case that:
9
  This proof is an adaptation to the present framework of the proof of Theorem 7.14 in
Appendix E of Gärdenfors (1988).  In the proof, we assume that the belief operator B and the
operators for expansion and revision satisfy closure under logical implication and
conjunction (i.e., that they satisfy the closure conditions of the modal system K).  This of
course follows from the relational semantics given to these operators.
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x ‚ ¬B¬(α ∨ β) and x ‚ ¬B¬(α ∨ γ).
We are going to consider the complex operation:
[+(α ∨ β)][∗(β ∨ γ)].
Claim 1. x ‚ [+(α ∨ β)][∗(β ∨ γ)]Bβ.
Proof of claim 1:  We first show that:
(3) x ‚ [+(α ∨ β)]¬B¬(β ∨ γ).
By (E2), it suffices to prove:
x ‚ ¬B((α ∨ β) → ¬(β ∨ γ)).
Suppose to the contrary that
x ‚ B((α ∨ β) → ¬(β ∨ γ)).
But this implies that:
x ‚ B¬β,
contrary to the assumption.  Hence, (3) follows by reductio.
(3) yields by the schema (2),
(4) if x ‚ [+(α ∨ β)][+(β ∨ γ)]Bβ,
then x ‚ [+(α ∨ β)][∗(β ∨ γ)]Bβ.
Now,
(5) x ‚ [+(α ∨ β)][+(β ∨ γ)]Bβ
holds, just in case,
x ‚ B(([α ∨ β) ∧ (β ∨ γ)] → β).
But since α , β and γ are pairwise incompatible, it follows that ≠[α ∨  β) ∧
(β ∨ γ)]≠ = ≠β≠.  Hence, we have that (5), which together with (4) yields:
x ‚ [+(α ∨ β)][∗(β ∨ γ)]Bβ.
By a completely symmetrical argument, we get:
Claim 2: x ‚ [+(α ∨ γ)][∗(β ∨ γ)]Bγ.
Claims 1 and 2 yield, by the Ramsey test (notice that, the agent’s belief state
after having expanded with α ∨ β and α ∨ γ, respectively, is consistent):
(6) x ‚ [+(α ∨ β)]B((β ∨ γ) > β)
(7) x ‚ [+(α ∨ γ)]B((β ∨ γ) > γ).
But (6) and (7) yield:
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(8) x ‚ [+α]B((β ∨ γ) > β)
(9) x ‚ [+α]B((β ∨ γ) > γ).
Using the Ramsey test again, we get:
(10) x ‚ [+α][∗(β ∨ γ)]Bβ
(11) x ‚ [+α][∗(β ∨ γ)]Bγ.
Hence,
(12) x ‚ [+α][∗(β ∨ γ)]B(β ∧ γ).
But, since ≠β ∧ γ≠ = ∅, we get:
(13) x ‚ [+α][∗(β ∨ γ)]B⊥.
But this is contrary to the consistency condition (C).  Thus, we have obtained a
contradiction and proved the theorem. Q.E.D.
The straightforward conclusion seems to be that the only way to accommo-
date Ramsey conditionals within DDL is to give up the Preservation condition.
In this respect, there is an analogy between higher-order beliefs and Ramsey
conditionals.  Admitting either requires that we give up Preservation.  Higher-
order beliefs and Ramsey conditionals are alike in that they should sometimes be
given up when we add new information to our stock of beliefs — even when the
new information is compatible with our old beliefs.  It is not surprising that
Ramsey conditionals behave like beliefs about beliefs in this respect.  After all,
what the Ramsey test says is that the agent should accept the conditional “If α,
then β” just in case he is disposed to accept β, if he were to learn α.  That is, the
agent’s acceptance of conditionals should reflect his conditional dispositions to
believe.  In the light of new information compatible with what the agent
believes, it might very well be rational to relinquish some of these conditional
dispositions.  But then, according to the Ramsey test, the agent should also cease
to believe the corresponding conditionals.
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